



Ciani v. San Diego Trust
and Savings Bank,
25 Cal. App. 4th 563,
94 D.A.R. 9444,
No. D017790 (June 1, 1994).
Attorneys' Fees Are Properly
Denied Since Plaintiff's
Involvement in Lawsuit and
Administrative Proceedings
Was Unnecessary
In this proceeding, Anthony Ciani ap-
pealed from a judgment which denied his
request for reimbursement of the attorneys'
fees he incurred in a lawsuit and in a post-
litigation administrative appeal. Both pro-
ceedings were to prevent San Diego Trust
and Savings (SDT&S) from destroying
the so-called "Green Dragon Colony" in
La Jolla. The trial court held that Ciani's
involvement in the lawsuit was unneces-
sary as it duplicated the work of state
attorneys.
On July 9, 1991, Ciani learned of a stip-
ulated agreement between SDT&S and the
City of San Diego which resulted in the
issuance of a coastal development permit
(CDP) authorizing the demolition of the
Green Dragon Colony; that same day, Ciani
notified the Coastal Commission of the im-
pending plan to demolish the structures. On
July 10, 1991, Ciani again contacted the
Commission, as well as Deputy Attorney
General Jamee Patterson, and implored
them to act to stop the demolition. Because
demolition had already commenced, Patter-
son expressed initial doubt as to whether a
lawsuit and injunction to stop demolition
could be filed in time to save the structures.
In the afternoon of July 10, Ciani and Patter-
son filed separate, but essentially identical,
lawsuits seeking to stop demolition pending
a judicial determination of whether the
Commission had appellate jurisdiction to
review the City-issued permit. In Ciani v.
San Diego Trust and Savings Bank (1991)
233 Cal. App. 3d 1604 (Ciani I), the Fourth
District ultimately ruled that the Commis-
sion has jurisdiction to review the permit,
and ruled the demolition be stayed to permit
the Commission to exercise its appellate
jurisdiction. However, following an admin-
istrative proceeding at which Ciani advo-
cated rejection of the permit, the Commis-
sion issued aCDPallowing demolition, sub-
ject to some modifications.
In affirming the trial court's rejection
of Ciani's attorneys' fees claim, the Fourth
District found substantial support for the
trial court's conclusion that Ciani's partic-
ipation in the lawsuit was not necessary,
one of the requirements for attorneys' fees
under Code of Civil Procedure section
1021.5. Among other things, the Fourth
District found that the theory which Ciani
argued was "identical" to that advanced by
the Commission.
The Fourth District also held that the
trial court was justified in considering
Ciani's participation in the subsequent
Commission proceedings not to be an ac-
tivity entitling an award of attorneys' fees
under section 1021.5; the Fourth District
had previously opined that section 1021.5
is limited to parties in ajudicial action and
does not extend to fees incurred in an
administrative proceeding. Unless Ciani's
activities before the Commission were
useful and necessary and directly contrib-
uted to the resolution of the underlying
substantive judicial proceeding, they are
not to be considered for purposes of a
section 1021.5 award. In this case, the
Fourth District found that this requirement
was not met, since the benefit in Ciani I
was the affirmation of the Commission's
appellate jurisdiction, and that benefit
"arose and was complete regardless of
subsequent proceedings" (emphasis orig-
inal).
Finally, the Fourth District found that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in rejecting Ciani's request for fees under
the "substantial benefit" doctrine, which
allows a litigant who has sued in his rep-
resentative capacity to recover fees when
the litigant's efforts have created a sub-
stantial, actual, and concrete pecuniary or
nonpecuniary benefit, such benefit re-
dounds to members of an ascertainable
class, and the court's jurisdiction over the
subject matter makes possible an award
which spreads the cost proportionately
among the members of the benefitted
class. The theory rests on concepts of un-
just enrichment: those enriched by an eco-
nomic windfall should bear their fair share
of the costs expended to create the benefits
obtained. The Fourth District found that
the benefits resulting from Ciani's actions
did not increase anyone's revenues; did
not reduce anyone's expenses; did not cre-
ate a fund for the benefit of a recognizable
group; and were not "substantial" in na-
ture. Further, the court opined that "it is
difficult to identify an entity or ascertain-
able class which may have received these
benefits, and as to which it isjust that some
payment be required."
Shahvar v. Superior Court, ASP
Computer Products, et al., Real
Parties in Interest,
25 Cal. App. 4th 653,
94 D.A.R. 7505,
No. HO 11565 (June 2, 1994).
Litigation Privilege Does Not
Apply to Communication That
Does Not Further the Objects of
Petitioner Elias Shahvar transmitted a
facsimile copy of a civil complaint con-
taining false allegations to a San Francisco
newspaper; the facsimile communication
induced the newspaper to publish an arti-
cle that summarized the complaint's alle-
gations. The Civil Code section 47 "litiga-
tion privilege" shields certain statements
from defamation liability; according to
California caselaw, the usual formulation
is that the privilege applies to communi-
cations made in judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, by litigants or other partici-
pants authorized by law, to achieve the
objects of the litigation, and that have
some logical relation to the action. Fur-
ther, a document is not privileged merely
because it has been filed; the privileged
status of a particular statement depends on
its relationship to an issue in an underlying
action.
Applying the legal standard to the
facts, the Sixth District Court of Appeal
concluded that Shahvar's communication
of his allegations to the newspaper was
unrelated to the litigation and therefore
not covered by the litigation privilege. In
so ruling, the Sixth District disagreed with
Abraham v: Lancaster Community Hospi-
tal (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 796, which
held that a party's conduct in causing the
allegations in his proposed amended fed-
eral complaint to be published in the local
press, and disseminating them within the
local medical community, was absolutely
privileged under section 47. According to
the Sixth District, Abraham's conclusions
are unsupported by caselaw, policy, or
statute. The Sixth District criticized Abra-
ham for inventing "a 'bridge' privilege
between privileged pleadings and a pre-
sumably privileged report which extended
Civil Code section 427's privilege to the
transmittal of pleadings to the press." Ac-
cording to the Sixth District, "[t]his
'bridge' privilege is an unwarranted exten-
sion of Civil Code section 47 beyond its
terms."
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Brown, et al., v. West Covina
Toyota,
26 Cal. App. 4th 555,
94 D.A.R. 9555,
No. B083055 (June 30, 1994).
Attorneys' Fees Are Not
Recoverable Under Rees-Levering
Automobile Sale Finance Act in
Warranty Breach Case
The Second District Court of Appeal
reviewed a municipal court's attorneys'
fee award of $31,300 to West Covina
Toyota and against a consumer complain-
ant under Civil Code section 2983.4, part
of the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales
Finance Act (Rees-Levering), Civil Code
section 2981 et seq. According to the alle-
gations of the complaint, Brown pur-
chased a 1989 Toyota Tercel from Toyota
in May 1990 for $11,970.88 pursuant to a
written contract; the car had on it 23,917
miles; Toyota also "appended to the [ve-
hicle] a service contract which defendants
told plaintiff, and plaintiff reasonably be-
lieved, was an express written warranty in
which [Toyota] warranted to perform any
repairs or replacement of parts necessary
to ensure that the [vehicle] and the com-
ponents therein were free from all defects
in material and workmanship"; in Novem-
ber 1990, at 30,621 miles, Brown discov-
ered that the vehicle failed to conform to
the warranties "in that defects, non-
conformities, misadjustments or malfunc-
tions relating to the front end were exhib-
ited." Brown also discovered that the ve-
hicle had been involved in an accident
prior to its sale to her, contrary to Toyota's
representation.
In her complaint for rescission of con-
tract, Brown sought a judicial declaration
of rescission plus incidental damages and
attorneys' fees; among other things, the
first cause of action alleged that "the con-
tract is either a 'conditional sales contract'
subject to the provisions of the Rees-Lev-
ering Motor Vehicle Sales and Finance
Act...or a 'lease contract' subject to the pro-
visions of the Vehicle Leasing Act, Civil
Code section 2985.7 et seq." Brown's other
causes of action included breach of express
warranty underthe Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act (Song-Beverly), breach of im-
plied warranty of merchantability under
Song-Beverly, violation of statute under
Song-Beverly, violation of Consumers
Legal Remedies Act, and fraud.
On January 4, 1993, the municipal
court granted Toyota's motion for a di-
rected verdict; Toyota then filed a memo-
randum of costs seeking attorneys' fees of
$31,300 and other costs which together
totaled $32,646. In a declaration accom-
panying the cost memorandum, Toyota
claimed that the transaction giving rise to
this lawsuit was the sale of a used vehicle
by a contract which is subject to the pro-
visions of Rees-Levering; Toyota claimed
that, pursuant to Civil Code section 2983.4,
a provision of Rees-Levering, Toyota is a
prevailing party entitled to reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs. On March 1, 1993,
plaintiffs filed a motion to strike Toyota's
memorandum of costs on the ground that the
gravamen of plaintiffs' action sounded in
violations of Song-Beverly and fraudulent
misrepresentation; under section 1794(d) of
Song-Beverly, the legislature specifically
excluded the seller from recovery of costs
and attorneys' fees. On March 2, 1993, the
court entered a judgment in Toyota's favor
for costs and attorneys' fees totaling
$32,646.
The Second District explained that the
issue before it is whether the action in-
volved a cause of action or claim under
Rees-Levering. After reviewing the appli-
cable statutory language and applying it to
the record before it, the Second District
concluded that because Brown asserted no
facts which could invoke Rees-Levering,
Toyota is not entitled to costs and attorneys'
fees under that Act. The court found that the
gravamen of the action, or primary right
which Brown sought to enforce, involved
an alleged breach of warranty; according
to the court, "[n]owhere in the complaint,
or in any other part of this record, have
appellants asserted a breach by respondent
of any duty relating to the financing or
repossession of the vehicle, or any other
duty arising under Rees-Levering."
Westbrook v. Los Angeles
County,
27 Cal. App. 4th 157,
94 D.A.R. 10730,
No. B068360 (July 28, 1994).
Penal Code Scheme Bars
Unrestricted Access to Municipal
Court's Information System
The Second District Court of Appeal
considered whether a private entity in the
business of selling criminal background
information to the public is entitled to
obtain a compilation of data from a
database maintained by the Municipal
Courts of Los Angeles County; the Munic-
ipal Court Information System (MCI) con-
tains information gathered from individ-
ual criminal files, including information
from booking slips, arrest reports, and
other materials that are filed in each case,
including name, aliases, monikers, ad-
dress, race, sex, date of birth, place of
birth, height, weight, hair color, eye color,
criminal investigation and identification
number, FBI number, social security num-
ber, California operating license number,
arresting agency, booking number, date of
arrest, offenses charged, police disposi-
tion, county and court name, date com-
plaint filed, original charges and disposi-
tion. Although the trial court expressed
concern over the loss of privacy which
would result from giving private compa-
nies access to this information, it ruled that
plaintiff and respondent Robert West-
brook was entitled to copies of the entire
MCI on computer tape not more than one
time per month upon payment of a reason-
able amount for each copy.
In reversing the trial court's decision,
the Second District noted that dissemina-
tion of information in the hands of local
criminal justice agencies is controlled by
Penal Code sections 13200 through 13326.
Specifically, section 13300 sets forth sig-
nificant restrictions on access to local
summary criminal history information; al-
though certain persons, agencies, and en-
tities are entitled to receive the informa-
tion if it is "needed in the course of their
duties," others may obtain the information
only "upon a showing of a compelling
need" and subject to specified restrictions.
The court noted that, despite these restric-
tions, Westbrook was allowed to obtain
monthly copies of computer tapes con-
taining all criminal offender record infor-
mation generated by the municipal courts
of Los Angeles County, "not because he
has demonstrated any legally acceptable
need to know the information, but solely
because he wants to sell the information to
others."
The court also rejected Westbrook's
contention that the tapes are public re-
cords which must be available to the pub-
lic, despite possible misuse of the data by
others, noting that all of the authorities
cited by Westbrook in support of this as-
sertion contain general language to the
effect that in the absence of a contrary
statute or a countervailing public policy,
court records are public documents which
must remain available for public inspec-
tion. The court stated that none of the cited
authorities are controlling, since this case
involves a contrary statute and a counter-
vailing public policy.
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Cortez v. Bootsma, tise. However, the First District opined
that the Lottery makes "every effort" to
27 Cal. App. 4th 935, ensurethat he public knows that "million-
94 D.A.R. 11704, dollar" prizes are awarded over a twenty-
No. D017438 (Aug. 19, 1994). year period, and rejected plaintiffs' argu-
ment that the Lottery's advertisements
Local Rule Cannot Limit Discretion mislead the public.
Vested in Trial Court to Award
Reasonable Attorneys' Fees
In this proceeding, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal considered whether a
local court rule can limit the amount of an
attorneys' fee award when a statute requires
the superior court to award "reasonable
attorneys' fees"; the applicable statute in this
case authorizing attorneys' fees is Labor
Code section 3709. In the underlying action,
the jury awarded plaintiff $121,938.24; the
trial court then determined that a reasonable
attorneys' fee was $65,000. However, Rule
6.1 of the San Diego County Superior Court
Rules provided that in contested actions no
attorneys' fees could be awarded "in excess
of the amount agreed by the plaintiff to be
paid to the plaintiff's attorney." In this
case, plaintiff and his attorney agreed to a
40% contingent fee, which would have
amounted to $48,775 based on the jury
award.
On appeal, Cortez contended that to
the extent the local rule limits the trial
court's ability to craft a "reasonable"
award required under state law, it is super-
seded. The Fourth District agreed, holding
that when the legislature grants statutory
authority to the trial courts to award rea-
sonable attorneys' fees, a local rule may
not limit discretion by restricting the
amounts awardable. To the extent that
Rule 6.1 so conflicts with state law, it is
inapplicable.
DeWitt-Carter v. Sharp,
No. A063985 (Sept. 9, 1994).
Court Rejects Claim That
California Lottery Advertising
is Misleading
In an uncertified, unpublished opinion,
the First District Court of Appeal rejected
a claim that the California State Lottery
engages in misleading advertising by over-
stating the true value of its "million-dollar"
prizes. In support of their claim, plaintiffs
contended that what the Lottery advertises
as a $1 million prize has a true value of only
$375,000, since the prize is paid out in in-
stallments over a twenty-year period. Lot-
tery officials admitted that they need to in-
vest only approximately $500,000 in U.S.
Treasury bonds in order to generate each
"million-dollar prize" which they adver-
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